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One noticeable absence in Leo Kuperfs atasldasd work an the 1952 
defiance campaign (l) is a detailed xegZonaL examination, Although 
there a r e  many fee-tnxPe~ of the campaign, some of which w i l l  be 
referred t o ,  that were common t o  al l  regions, there a r e  also maxized 
dissimilarities. 2-1 th i s  paper, only 'the two principal meas of 
resistance, the Eastern Cape and the ! k ~ m 8 v a ,  are considered. 
Within these confines, attention is focused initially on certain 
basic hiteracting factors which seem to  influence the pattern of the 
campaign, then on the foms of resis.ta;nce or@zation, the nahme 
of fhe ledemhip and, flna2ly, the range of & and. file 
participation. 
Resistmce in the Easeern Cape was fas more widely 
distributed than in the TnmsvaaL (2) and. subject t o  leas  control 
f r o m  the provincial defiance headquarters. One of the vasiables 
accounting f o r  this is the a f f e ren t  pattern of urban settlemen% in 
the two provinces, ( 3 )  Within a thirty-five mile radius of 
Johannesburg me the ten most gapulom towns3 in %he pmvince, an& 
these consti-tuted the main centres of resistmce activity there. (4) 
By contrast, the t w o  principal mban complexes and places of defiance 
in the Fastern Cape, Pork Elizabeth-TJiGenhage and East London, axe 
approxima+ely one hundxed and ninety miles apart by mad; nex* to 
these in size are Queenstotm, Grahamstown, and other centres, 
~ c a t t e m d  from fifty t o  one hundred and f i f ty  miles fmra either of 
the two major foci. The juxtaposition and ease of commdcation in 
-the two provinces between the urban and reserve meas  diffex 
considerably. k general, interchange in the Eastern Cape was 
fairl;y easy and on a wide scale, which W of major bqartmce t o  the 
spread of resistance 50 the d p&a of the Province in 1952. 
Significant differences occur, too, jn the n a k e  of -he 
urban A.fr&can population of the h a  regions. The presence on the 
Rand of members of all the principal ethnic and lin&stic group~l 
Ijving in South Africa, and many fmm outside i t s  borders (5), 
contrasts sharply wi-th the position in the Wtem Cape, where, in 
the main centres, A f x i c ~  are almost entirely Xhosa speaking, 
coming fmm within the EasGem Cape, an azea which has been *efr 
home for generationam ( 6 )  Certaidy,  wit- the Xhosa them was a 
fundamental division of life style between the so-called "Red" and 
llSchoolif people, but this did not prevent msistmce leadem in the 
Eastern Gape making use of the common Xhosa i d e n t i b  and traditions 
of the majority of the African people b the region when encaumging 
invo3venrent ia the campaign. (7) 
me varying pattern from one area of the boun%ry t o  anathex 
of African involvement in non-tmditional p o l i t i c a l  activitfes 
help to account f o r  different levels of participation in the campaign. 
Africam in the Eastern Cape, especially in the Ciskei, had a long 
history of association with the politic= aphere. (8) This 
i s  demonstrafed by their  involvement, notably from the 18708, in the 
pmcedures for elect* members of parliament. hteresthgly,  the 
Fingo, who comprised .the first Cape African voters, form a major 
element; of the population o f  the Peddie district, which was an 
important centre of resistance d w h g  the camp&@ and by far the 
most significant area of Jtural opposition. Other centres, too, in 
the Ciskei plwed a p d e n t  defiance sble. ( 9 )  To electoral 
experience may be added that acquired bug31  p d i c i p a t i o n ,  fol: 
example, in Vigilance Associations, the I.C.U., artd. the A.N*C. The 
extent and conthmity of politicization from these other sources 
should not be unduly st ressed amy more t h n  the importance of these 
antecedents in act- as a catalyst t o  resistance in, the Eastern 
Cape in 1952, but, celrtahly,  h trying t o  assess Why the  campajgm 
achieved the level of paxticipation it did in. that sea, the factor 
o f  the deep rooted political c t i l h e  of the Xhusa/kingp peoples 
cannot be ignored. (10) 
It is 5mpossibLe t o  be more precise about the significance 
of African poli t ical  expe~ience in the Transvaal t o  levels of 
resistance pak ic ipa t ion  in 1952. The contribution of bodies such 
as the I.C.U., the A.X.C., and the C o d s t  P& to African 
political education and experience, particularly in the urbm are=, 
was considesable thou& possibly on am even more h%ermi t ten t  basis 
than in the Eastern Cape, 31 the rural districts of the two  
provinces, -bhe divergence in experience was m o ~ t  m k e d  and the 
appamnt lack of involvement h the n m o d e m f ~ o l i t i c a l  sphere of  
some mml African c o d t i e s  in the %a32~v&al IBJ well have 
contributed t o  their non-participation h the campaign. 
PinaJly, +he organization and. character o f  the camp&@ 
was affected by certain laws and regulations which did not apply 
equal ly in the two Provinces. liz Port  Elizabeth, at the be- 
of the campaign, there was, fox example, no influx control imposed 
on Africans Wi&bg  t o  enter urban meas, nor were they subject t o  
curfew regulations. Ih geneml, them appeazs t o  have been less 
restriction on non-Wte p o l i t i c a l  activity i n  the Bsterm Cape than 
in the urban or d districts of the Tra;ns&. A t  the same t h e ,  
r e l a t ive  t o  Africans in the T m v a a l ,  those in the Eastern Cape 
were tbxeatened with a gmatex loss of ri&ts andl t h i s  may hatre 
acted as an additional spur t o  resistance. (11) The contraatbg 
factors considemd above were not ao important as t o  prevent a 
cormnon recognition amongst non-White leaders in these and the other 
pmvhces that joint action was required t o  demonstrate t h e i r  
intense apposition t o  the steadily more repressive set of ru les  by 
which the count ry  was governed, but they m a ~ r  s w a t  why, in certain 
respects, the cmpaj@ displayed colwidemble regional d5fferences. 
Reading Feit (12), one has the impression that the A.N,C . 
was divided @ a t  itself, split horizontally vertically i n t o  
units which scarcely c o h c a t e d  w i t h  one another. But to what 
extent is th is  borne out by a study of the organizational network 
supporting the defiance campaign in the Eastem Cape and the 
Transvaal? (13) Any such examination must cleazly not only take 
account of the f o n d .  structure of the Congresses - an aspect to 
which PeiS perhaps gtves undue attention - but alao  t o  the extensive 
web of ad hoc, personal contacts at and between all levels. 
Ih both the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal, the 
orgmization (14) of the campaign was a combined operation, relying 
not only on the support of activists involved primarily with the 
"parentvt C o w e s s e a  but d s o  those more heavily engaged with the 
Youth and Women's Leaguee, and, to a limited extent, other 
associations outside the anbrit of the Congmsses, 
The Youth Leagues (15) , as distinct bodies, were 
pa r t i cdmly  active in Johannesburg, where thei r  orgmizations were 
mobilized t o  produce and circulate propaganda, t o  distribute welfare 
supplies, and to encoumge people to volunteer as msistexs. In 
the Eastern Cape, the assistance of the A.H.C. 'Youth League, p e ~  se, 
in contributing- to the organization of the campaign was very 
limited except in Fast Inndon. In Port Elizabeth, members of the 
Lewe did con4xibute t o  the administration of the defiaace 
movement, but as bdividuals. (16) 
T h e ~ e  is a dearth of detailed i n f o m a t i o n  about the 
activitiee, dming the Defiance Campaign, of t h e  A,EJ,C, Womenls 
Leagues, paral le l  Indian Congress orgmiaatfons, and other women's 
associations which may have played a31 imporbant  mle in the 
mobilization of volunteers, finance, and welfare supplies for the 
campaim, The 1952 annua2 conference of the Transvaal A.N.C. 
Women@s League resolved to recruit three thousand women volunteers 
which at least indicates an ktended organizational function (17), 
and C o w s s  activists, interviewed, have referred to women's funcl 
raising and welfare activities both in the Eastern Cape and the 
Tra;llsvaa;l. 
Both the C o w s s  Youth and Wotuents associations, f o r  the 
most p&, sppeaz to have followed Mmdela's call  to the A.N.G. 
Youth League t o  place themselves l7entire1y at the disposal of our 
national or&zalionsv . (18) 
Outside the Congresses, very small scale assistance was 
received from non-White trade unions in the TxmsvaaL and the 
Eastern Cape. (19) Altho- many u n i o n i s t s  were active in %he 
campaign in the  two regions, it was almost d w ~ a  in their individual. 
capacities. However, the Colowed Trade Union Political Action 
Committee, based in Johamesburg, under James PhilLips,  was 
apparently responsible for mobilizing the f e w  Coloured resisters jn 
the Tmsvaal. Another possible arena fo r  securing support for the 
carppaign, p h i c u l a r l y  in the Eastem Cape, was that of the 
churches. The African Znter-Denominational U s t e r s '  Federation 
gave a clem l e d  at a conference h August 1952, when it was agreed, 
d o u s l y ,  to Link with t h e  A.N.C. in "the struggle f o r  African 
freedom". (20) It would be of interest to elicit detailed 
infopnation about the function, if any, of the  African sepazatist 
churches in the campais: Kuper suggests that it was not 
s i d f i c a n t  (211, but this question and that of the Ale of non- 
Congress women's organizations require further s t u d y  before arciving 
at definite conclusions. 
With the exception of women's p u p s  outside the Congmsses, 
and the Churches, the defiance orgmizat ion thmu&out South Africa 
was under %he f o W  aegis of the Rat ionaJ  Action Council. (22) 
comprised f o m  Africans and three =dims nominated by and f r o m  their 
respective Congress Ekecutives. (23) The m a j o r i Q  of 111embem were 
probably fzom Johannesbusg, where the Council met monthly d 
sometimes at  less frequent intervals. Beheen these meet* there 
w i l l  have been informal contacts, notably amongst Council members 
resident h, or near, the City, Effectively, they constituted a 
working comi t tee .  The functions of the Action Council seem to have 
been confined lmgely to ap-pmviq occasional major policy decisions 
and to reviewing the pmppess of the campaim; it also provided a 
f o r m  f o r  contact between leaders operating in various p a t s  of the 
country. Whether it was a source of much original. thoug31t i s  
questionable; nose likely, it was primasily a ratifying body f o r  
proposals evolved at A.N.C . National Ekecutive meet- (24) or by 
key p o l i t i c a l  leaders in Johannesburg. 
The National Volunteers C O - o r h t h g  Council appeass 
never t o  have convened, altho'ygh a national volunteer in chief and a 
deputy were appointed, similar posts also beimg created at the 
provhcid  level. (25) 
The number of occasions requ2rhg fo& contact between 
the national and sub-national echelons of the defiance organization 
was limited; much of the interchange necessary could be conducted 
t b u g b  activists operating bokh at the na.tiod and provincial or 
local levels (26)  and f r o m  visits by lead.ing n a t i o a  figures ta the 
regions. (27) !!?he extensive flow of mitten material was effecti~ely 
precluded by the absence of a s e p m t e  adminietrative machine at the 
national.  level and +he limited manpower and financial. resources 
available t o  provincial and loca l  resistance organizations. 
The driving force in tbe orgamization, came f r o m  sub- 
national units responsible f o r  the to - mmgement of the 
campaim. In the T m v d  this function was undertaken principally 
by the specidly appointed PmvinciaJ. Action Council, which comprised 
representatives of the African and kdian Congresses. (28) This body 
met Wly during the most active periods of the struggle. It had at 
its disposal the limited administrative resources of the Cong.sesaesl 
pmvLsj.ond headquarters, it controlled the operations of the 
pmviacid volunteer in chief, and could c d l  f o r  the assistance of 
youth and women's gmups as well as Congmss branch organizations, 
The la t ter  did not have the authority to take independent resistance 
Utiativea. ( 2 9 )  But, clearly, branch organizations could be of 
consiaexable assistance in securing- and maintaining support for -the 
campaie. This pattern contrasts strongly with that of the Cape, 
where there was no province-wide action council, the western d 
eastern regions functioning autonomously. (30) Zn, the latter, at 
the outset of the Campaign, there was no pro8pect o f  significaZIt 
Coloured o r  A s i a n  participation, nor were these communities 
represented by associations which could co-operate ~ 5 t h  the B.N.C, 
in a joint regional council. No fo- action council was created 
in the Eastern Cape, but membem of the provincial. A.N.C. Executive 
living in the region used t o  meet approximately weekly, and a 
secretaziat, dram f r o m  Executive members based h Port Elizabeth, 
daily, to plan and discuss resistance in the -a with which they 
were actively concerned. The control these committees exercised 
over defiance 5n the region operated on a different basis a& does 
not compaxe in degree with that of the joint T~a~lsvaal. eadership, 
Effectively, the detailed planning and mounting of resistance 
offeneives within the reg5on appears to have been conducted by 
individual, semi-autonomous units. (31) In Port n i z a b e t h  and East 
London, these comprised several branches, with a total membership 
in thousands; amaller units were active in at least ten provine id  
towns and many villages, paxbicularly in the Ciskei. This latter 
gmup, locally m, often in a h i m  incXviduaListic =er, wowld 
appear t o  provide an example pas excellence of -ss-mots p o l i t i c a l  
orgmizations. It seems remonable that the existence of lagely  
self-governing- branches and the experience m d  from them were 
factors relevant to the particular resilience of Eastern Cape 
resistance t o  the Government. Far f m m  try- to establish a more 
centralized pattern, Dr. N jongwe (321, fox example, apparently 
encoumged chosen rank and file A.X.C. membera returning to their  
home areas t o  in~titute loca l  Corgress branches. (33) These 
activists were given basic instructions as: to how the unit should 
be orgaaized, but, thereafter, outside executive control would be 
very intermittent. The latter applied equally to existing branches 
outside Port Elizabeth-nit-, but senior officials did viait 
centres thra@ou% t h e  Eastern Cape f r o m  time to time, p d l y  in an 
endeavour to ensure a measure of u n i f o d *  in - h e  A.N.C. 
orgmization in the region. Contacts could a lso  be maintained tbrou#~ 
Cowessr members travelling between the m a i n  centres md the country 
districts. The decentralized pattern of the orwization jn the 
r e a o n ,  a produet of a fortuitous combination of choice and 
necessity, though the mbject of some criticism at the time in 
C o n p e s s  circles, permitted a far hi&er level of participation and 
politicisation than would have been possible if a more rigid system 
had. existed. 
An in~i&t of the administration of certain speciaist 
functions completes W8 brief examination of the campaignls 
organizational framework. The recruitment, training and wePfaxe o f  
resisters were the reaponsibilitg. of the volmteers in chief and 
-their deputies. B the Tmnavaal, both m e n g  Seperepere and 
A .  E. Pate1 did actively seek suppork fox the Congresses - on 
occasion with the assistance of Youth League members - and it is 
probable that the t w o  men scrutinized at least some of the 
volunteer application f o m ,  However, there is no indLcation that 
they personally supervised the tmini.ng of resisters; welfare 
matters were managed by the aged R. Naidoo, helpea by youth aetivlsts. 
Sepereperels and Pa+eL% authority may haye been l b i t e d  by the 
presence in Johannesburg of Nelson Handela, the national volunteer in 
chief, and his depuw, I. A. Caohalia. ( 34) To a faz greater extent 
than. in the Transvaal, the intended functions of a provincial. 
volunteer in chief could not  be put i n t o  practice h the Cape. Mcot t  
Gwenbhe did occasionally address meet- In M s  die of Cape 
volunteer in chief, but he was far more heavily engaged in the task 
of directing resistance in East Lonaon, Whe-Eher Gwentshe met Nelson 
m e l a  dming the latterls visits t o  the Eastern Cape spec id ly  to 
discuss the volunteer position in the region ox province is uncerkxln, 
but seem unlikely. 
No specialist c o d t t e e s  appear t o  have been established in 
the Fastern Cape or -be  TransvaaJ. to cope with the campaign's 
financial affairs. This wm in spite  of the call of the  Joint 
Planning Council f o r  a "One million Shilling Driveff. Inadequte 
organization, 05 my k W ,  was a reason f o r  the failure of this 
fund,. (35) The Mrican and Indian Congesses retained their own 
accounts and there wass no comanon financid pool ( 3 6 )  nor specid 
fund for the campaign. Methods o f  raising funds vqried, but 
Wnationa were normally on m ad h c  rather than regular basis. In 
Port ELizabeth, R o b e d  Matji ( m v i s e d  a scheme in which short- 
lived slogan lapel badgea were sold at mass meetings, 
apparently considesably augmentkg Congress funds f o x  some period. (38) 
Sigpificant sums were also obtained in the main centres of the 
Betern Cape from social events o r w z e d  by women activists, and 
campaips in howing area8 and at factox5es. Additionally, C o w e s s  
finances in Port Elizabeth were  assisted by the fund m i s h g  
activities of Dr. V. MoodaJgr (39)  amongst Bsiaa traders. Bmnches 
in the smaller centres were left to marage their own financial 
affairs d u r h g  the campaign. fn the Trans~aal, dthou& funds were 
obtained by casvaasing African and Inam workers, m d  through 
women's orgpnization~, the major source of reTrenue was Asian traders 
and rnerdmats, living both in the u r b a  and in the country areas. 
These people were visited periodically, usually by Indian Co-ss 
off icials ,  sometjmes accompanied by their African counteqazts.  
Althougk the financial organization of the can&@ was haphzazd, 
whether it was a significant impediment to the p m p s ~ 3  of the 
struggle and whether feasible (more bureaucmtic) alternatives wotild 
have achieved materially better reaul ta  is doubtful. (40) 
The Congresses established no C O - o w t e d  specialist 
framework to exploit the p m p m d a  weapon. Occasional pamphlets 
and statemen+s were published under the imprint of -the mational 
Action Council, but it lacked i t s  own appa~ratua for the production 
and distribution of written matter, By. faz the largest number of 
leaflets a d  bmd-sheeta were issued by the Transvaal Provincial 
Action Council, and these w e r e  probably pmduced mostly by 
volunteers from the youth or&zations, (41) There is no hdicat ion 
that a formal publications committee existed h the Transvaal o r  the 
Eastern Cape. b the la t te r ,  very l i t t l e  wri t ten materiaJ was 
produced by the A.N.C. during the c a q a i p  and almost total reliance 
w a s  placed on the transmission of information by word of mouth. (42) 
The most significant, contin,uous and favourable s o m e  of 
pxhted M o m a t i o n  about the c a q ~ g n  came f r o m  outside the 
defiance or@aal;ion in the independent M a n  newspaper, the 
editor of which was in close contact with Defiance leaders and its 
reporters, Congress activists or sympathizers. (43) 
The cmgaQnfs organizational network, the verg antithesis 
of a uniform, formally structured bureaucratic machine divided into 
clear cut h i e m h i e s  &L& chazacterized by specidist  units, was 
suqrisi@y effective in mobi l izhg  support for the s-tmg@.e in the 
Eastern Cape and the Txaxts-vaal. Fa5 f r o m  being isolated units, the 
nmemw p u p s  responsible for organizing the campaipts affairs 
h the two regions were linked - admittedly looaely in the Eastern 
Gape - by a complex and wide rang5ng web of fosmal and informaL 
contacts, the foca l  point of which was Johannesburg. The particular 
pattern, which emerged lngelg spontaneously (44) in the Eastern 
Cape, though c o n t w  mmy wmkaesses was the most informative h 
suggesting the future course of resistance organization in South 
Afr5ca. 
The defiance leaders (45) in the two regions displayed 
many common features - collectively each was influenced by 
similar political and ethical  concepts; they derived from comparable 
social  gmupings, and, by -the very nature of the campaig~, adopted 
certain identical techniques of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  - but, nevertheless, 
re@onal differences m e  on occasions apparent.  
At the most basic, the leaders in the Eastern Cape, with 
the sole exception of Dr. Moodaley, were Africans, in contmst t o  
t h e  dual leadership of the TranavaaJ. in which the Jhdims, even if 
they eschewed the x61e of a CO-equal paztner, pl-d a verg 
s i a f i c a n t  p&, materially affect* the nature of the cmpaign in 
the Province, 
The common po l i t i ca l  denminatar amongst a l l  the leaders 
was the democratic ethic ,  - b e  basia on which the c m p a i p  was 
l egj t imted .  (46) The belief in %S ideal was reflected in the 
leaderst apparent acceptance of the "l ibeml" form of African 
natianalism. 
A natural corollary of the leaders! c d b e n t  to the 
democratic i d e d  was their re jec t ion  of race as a criterion central 
to the libemtion at??uggle. The degree of attachment on their 
p& to the concept of non-racialism may have varied, but leaders 
frequently reiterated that this mtion waa i n t e r n  t o  the camp&@. 
The participakion of different races could be interpreted not 00 
as a tactical move of some v a l u e  but as an indication of  a genuine 
belief amongst many leaders of the intrinsic benefit of a non-racial 
approach. 
Wdshe (47) suggests that the ideology and te&ologT of 
the class struggle was a fac tor  of t '~ome importancerT in enswing 
that the A.N.C. continued i t s  long established belief in a non-sacid 
society. (48) !&is may be so; it a l ~ o  ra ises  the wider question of 
the significance of Communist beliefs t o  the leademhip and campaig~. 
Communists were particulmly prominent, % h o w  n o t  in a majority, in 
the leadership of %he African d hdl.an Congresses in the Transva .  
But in the period under examination this label must be qualified or 
amplified by the h o w l e d g e  that they were,  f o r  example, d s o  
committed to ASrican nationaliwa and, at least temporarily, t o  the 
tecbniq~e of non-violent direct action, Their attachment to 
C o d s m  did. not necessarily justjfg analysing their actions solely 
in terms of t h i s  belief. CommLmist beliefs affected the language and 
emphasis of their speeches and writhgs, their  interpretation of the 
potential of African nationalism and concepts of a f u h e  South 
African State under majority mite, bu-b the Conmmists were not 
concerned, particularly during a campaign, to wage an h t e d  
ideo loaca l  batt le  wrist other Congress leaders, to establish 
~ o d m  as the sole or domina;n% doctrine shaping the liberation 
movement. (49) A raze b t  minor exception to this laissez faire 
policy which prev&led during the  campaign occmed  in the Eastern 
- 
Cape where there were 5n fact very f e w  C o m m i a t s  in the Conpess 
h i e m h y .  W e e  Eomer members of the C o m m i s t  Pasty who held 
off ice in the A.N.C. d w h g  the campaie were in dispute, partly an 
ideological grounds, w i t h  Dr. Njongyre. But the C o m s t s ,  perhaps 
because of the other influences shaping their political views and 
because they were pmguatists,  usually showed themselves more 
anxious to promote radical uni* than doctrinal orthodayp. 
A contrasting, and more si&ficant force, especially in 
the Eastern Cape, was Christian doctrine, (50)  The majority of 
senior African defiance leaders probably held Chistim beliefs, and 
prieste were well represented in their x&s. (51) Congrese leaders 
made frequent use of b i b l i c a l  references (52), and the senior 
chaplain of the A.N.C., Rev. J. Skomolo, even conceived of the 
st rugde  as a holy m, in which all. Christ- had a duty to 
p d i c i p a t e ,  in opposition to the injustices of the oppressor. (53) 
C h i s t i a n  Beliefs played an important  r61e in the campaign as a 
source of restmint, both on *e A.N.C. leaders and their mpp~~rtem. 
It m, for example, have been one of the factora contributing t o  the 
African NationaJ C o n g ~ s s t  continued adherence to non-rz id  and non- 
violent ideals and practices. 
The adoption of non-violent means was neceseary tmticalu, 
but clearly it wasr d s o  cowistent with the beliefs of resistance 
leaders and with the tradition of the African an5 lizdian Congresses. 
Gandhi m e d  a figure of some influence. (54) Dr. Mjongwe 
remarked: t fwith the historica3 example of Gandhi befom W, we 
h e d  to Passitre Eesistance largely bemuse it secured results 
without creating bitterness between -he  contenders." ( 5 5 )  But no 
African and very few hdian leaders aclmowledged a doc t rha l  
attadment t o  Saw-, and most, instead, accepted a more flexible 
relat iomMp with non-violence, akin t o  that of H e h  and the Indian 
National Congress. (56) 
Cerkain African leaders (pnticulazly in the Eastern cape) 
made use of &eir lmowledge of t r i b d  history and rq-bhology as a 
means of r a i s i x g  m o d e  and encomaghg participation h the caaapai@. 
The history of the stmggles and mMevemen+s of other gmups, 
incl-u&ing the A s i a n s  and Afrikanem (57) h South Africa, the people 
of  k d i a  (58) ,and Negmes im the United States (59 )  offered 
additional sources of inspiration, but w i t h  the exception of the 
first of these, and possibly the e m l e  of the Indian hdepend,eme 
movement, these issues were  of marginal importance h affecting the 
character of a e  campaign. 
The dj.Pe~sSw of beliefs within and between defiance 
leaders enmmed that the campaim did not become m w l y  doctrinaire; 
+his encouraged flexibilitg in approach and an objective assessment 
of progress and achiev-ts. Nevertheless, there were certa in 
tenets accepted by aZ1 resistance leaders which gave the cnmpaigm 
purpose and direction. Admittedly, the presence of conflicting 
bel iefa  m y  have prevented the fomulat ion of a s-e, al.3. embracing 
ideological model or framework, but this omission, in 2952, was not 
o f  momentous importance, 
Amongst +he African leadership in both the Eastern Cape 
and the Transvaal, in relation t o  the African population, there was 
a proportionately lags m b e r  of highly educated and professional 
men. Ix the Eastern Cage, pmminent examples include D r s ,  Bokwe and 
Njongwe, Professor Matthews and his eldest  son, and the Rev. 
Calata. (60) m k s  and W. Bpape were  former teachers, Mdela  a 
lawyer, W. Nkomo a doctor, and D. Hji, the youth leader, a 
university student, all. of whom were active h the Transvaal during 
the campaign, Certainly there were o r m z e r s  who had had very 
little f o d  education - fox example, Natji, the Eastern Cape 
activist, and Moses Kotane - but,& least t o  the provincid level, 
h o s t  if not all the leaders were  literate. Even at the b m c h  
level, particularly in, the urban areas, it is probable that leaders 
with some education predominated. 
At the risk of digression, it is presumably from a 
recognition of the disproportionate representation of educated 
people, many of whom enjoyed a hi& occupational statue, that F e i t  
azgues "It is the African bourgeois, usually the  intellectual, who 
seeks t o  provide leadership in African or&satiom such as the 
A.N.C. But whatever his sinceritg and his capacilq f o r  leadership 
he is separated from the African masses by the very achievement that 
gives h h  el i te  sta-tw" , (61) The derogatory tern "bousg.eoist' 
provides a thomu&ly unsatisfactory image (62) of the majority of  
the A.N.C. leaderskfp in either province, ox elsewhere in, the 
country. Mandela, thou& a lawger, was also a member of the Tembu 
aristocracy and a sometime herd and plo@boy. Sisulu was 
similazly occupied in his youth and, although most recently a 
prope* writ, had. been both a f x t o r y  and a mine worker. 
S.  B. M k s ,  though once a teacher, had been an active trade d o n  
mi1itan.t f o r  t w e n t y  yeam. Can it be azgued, in ehe 15&t of -he  
1946 mine workers* strike, that he was trsepazated from the African 
massesv? Equally, could this b g e  be levelled at TTjongwe, who 
plwed a crucial r81e in mobilizing. the support of uneducated ox 
little educated taxban and rural inhabitants in the Eastern Cape? 
Feitta generdiaation w o u l d  appear to  misinterpret the significance 
of the occupational status and education of of the A.R.C. 
leaders. It is hazdly unusual f o r  a p o l i t i c a l  leadership to 
contain a h i e r  proportion of well educated people, some with 
sen ior  appointments, than is chazacteristic of the population as a 
whole, but h South Africa -the prevailing economic arad social 
regulations, the eazlier life of mamy of the Mxican Congress leaders 
and the very platfom on which they had riaen to power, encomaged 
close contact with the African workers in urban md often in rural  
m m ,  
The Transvaal Indian Congress leaderahip reflected more 
neazly the economic and social  groups present in their  commnity 
althou&, again, those at +he lower end of the scale may have been 
under-represented. In addition, the wed+Meat merchants no longer 
participated directly in Con@?ess affairs, and hence were not 
amongst the defiance leaders. 
Tn many respects detailed infomation about the p e a t  
majority of people aotive in the campaign either ih the Eastern Cape 
and Transvaal or elsewhere ie lacking. How m a q  were involved? ( 6  3) 
Who were they? What proportion, for exmple, were mi-t workers? 
Kow were literate? What percatage were new recruits to 
C o w e s s ?  What was the age structure and ratio of %he sexes? Eow 
did these factors vary between d i f f e r a t  regions? What individual 
reasons encawaged resisters  t o  take p& in the c m q a i p ?  Bow did 
they conceive this struggle, and, as Kuper asks, what W their 
attitude to non-violence? (64) 
Reglomal differences are jmme&iately appazent in terms of 
race. h the l3mtern Cape scascely any Coloureds or Indjauls, a d  no 
Whites, defied, aJ.-t,hou& Chinese and man traders and a f e w  Whites 
provided funds for the campaign, and some Coloured workers did 
observe the strike orpnized by the A.N.C. in Port Elizabeth, dwhg 
November 1952. (65) In addition, although these was never any 
prospect or encouragement of White defiance in the Pmvince, there 
w e r e  amicable and productive contacts between Congress leaders and 
certain le- members of the White commi.t;y, But in the T m s v a a l ,  
the minor i t y  races occupied a fm more important A l e ,  altha* the 
m b e s  of non-African defiers was fairly small. Approximately one 
hundred A s i a n s  (66 ) ,  eight Coloureds and a f&ker eight W t e s  
resisted. (67) pwbiculaz, more Indian paxticipation mi&t have 
been expected, but there are severaL reaeons for this reticence. 
The Indian leadership were keenly a w e  that neither they nor their 
followers should eclipse the d o m h n t  role assigped t o  the A.N.C. in 
the libemtion movement, and African leaders, for tactical reasons, 
would probably h ~ e  b en very unwilling to accept even an 
appm-tely equal level of participation fmm hdians and Africans. 
W s  ap&, in the T m n s v a d  were in a particularly insecure 
economic position, and open defiance of the G o v e r n a t  threatened 
their  status still M e r .  Thders were l i ab le  to be e e d  by the 
xvocation of their Licences and the imposition of res t r ic t iom,  wlzich 
authorities were very willing to employ. A specific ad recent 
detement t o  further resistance for fndians employed by Whites was 
the auLcame of the June 2950 w e r d  strike h which they had 
suffered more ~severeLy thasl the Africans f r o m  dismissals. Some my 
also have been reluctant because of the faflure of both t h e  1946-8 
resistance campaign and the strikes of 1950-1 to exact conceas5ons 
from the Gmenrment . Finally, the Inowledge that the campaign was 
not pr-ily or solely an fndian >affair my have reduced their 
w i l l h p e s s  t o  parbicipate. Nevertheless, a wide cmss-section of 
kdiam did defy, including factory workers, housewives, shop 
assieltants, -1 tmdexs , university students and p m f e s s i o ~ s  . (68) 
The on ly  significant economic group &ost entirely absent was that 
of the wealthiest members of the comnmity, although these people 
contributed to the caapaiprs f imces  (691, as did Indians living 
in the smaller centres, away f m m  the Rand, who otherwise were 
politically inactive a% this; t h e .  There was very little 
opposition voiced by hdim in the Province, but members o f  the 
accomodationist  Transvaal. -dim O r e s a t i o n  did not associate 
themselves w i t h  the campal@. 
Of the vexy f e w  r e s i s t e r s  from -the Colowed comrmrnities 
in the 'PmmvaaJ, three were tmde wnionists and factory employees 
and this was  probably true of +he reminder, In, the mon-ths 
preceding the csmpai- the Coloured population had been very 
vocifemus in defence of their thseatened ri&t to the cormnon m11 
franchise, but the momenb of this movement, led by the Fcmchise 
Action Council, diminished rapidly in the second quaster of 1952. 
Possesrsiag what one Coloured activist termed '%econd class 
jmmunities It, the majority of Coloured people wsre still unwilling to 
accept that their s t a h s  was inexorably coming to resemble that of 
t h e  other non-White gsoups, nor did they accept that the only hope 
o f  al le~iat ing their  position was thro* pat ic ipat ion in the 
African l e d  liberation movement. At the same time, with the 
exception of members of gmups affiliated to the Don-Eumpean Unity 
Movement, and the very few followers of the Trasvaaler Kleur1h-g 
VoUcsbould, Coloureds voiced little opposition to the cmqaign. 
The White activists in the Transvaal comprised four 
universi* members, two t rade union officials  and a writer. They 
were diverse, pol i t ica l ly ,  and their  decision t o  resist was 
essentially personal and not dependent on membership of any 
pazticulaz oxgmirratton. This gmup c q r i s e d  almost the t o t a l  
number of Whites in the Pmvince who were prepazed to resist. But 
others voiced oppos9tion to the deteriorating predicament of - h e  
non-Whites. Thia was demonstrated in the appeal d m h g  the 
defiance campaig by hen*-two - p e w  f o r  the revival of the 
Cape Liber& ideal ,  (70) 1% was alsc revealed at a meeting of two 
hundred Whites invited by the A.B.C. to di~lcuss the role of thei r  
race in the campaign. (71) Clearly -t;ho@, the vast m j o r i l q  of 
Whites were hostile an& would not contemplate any asaociatiqn with 
the campaim or even with *Tlberaltf groups. 
The diffe~ences Sn pmticipation between +he two provinces 
exkended to the African sector, Ln %he l i b t e r n  Cape approximately 
650 Africans a r e  known to have defied in the rural Peddie district(72) 
and a fmthr 730 in m 1  count ry  towns. (73)  Apparently these 
participants comprised both people who genemL3y lacked f o m d  
education and whom Mayer would refer t o  as Red People, and 
others who had been M u e n c e d  by non-traditionaJ values and who had 
often attended m i s s i o ~  schools. They will have comprised 
subsistence fanners and farm labourers, their wives and other womm 
resident in the rum1 -as, as well as commercial workers arnd their 
families living in the pmvincia.l,tewns. Ifatthews suggested that 
.the number of youtha participating m y  have been relatively few. 
What has proved impossible so far is to secure more precise and 
telling information about the rural actf~ists of the Eastern Cape - 
who undoubtedly cornprise one of the most intrim aspects of the 
1952 campaigm. There was: no parallel ruraJ. activity h the Transvaal 
except at Bekhal,  where a p u p  of faan workers defied. h the 
urban centres of both regions there were small h t  influentid 
s o u p s  o f  Africans drawn from higher socio-economic gmups who were 
active in support of the c a q a l ~ ,  but commercial a d  lindustrial 
employees constituted t h e  largest occupational group amongst the 
defiem, as they f i d  in the t o t a l  urban African working population. 
On the whole, Rand mine workers were noticeably absent amongst the  
p d i c i p a n t s ,  and at least in J o ~ e s b ~ g ,  proportionate to the 
t o t a l  African population, yew few of the poorest manual labourem 
appeatt: t o  have been politically active. It is possible that in, this 
respect, in terns of literacy, h the propo&ion of migrants and new 
~ e c r u i t s  and Sn, the xelLgiaus beliefs of - b e  majoxib of the 
volunteers, there was a marked variation in the male resiatem of 
the Eastem Cape and the Transvaal. (74) African women took park in 
-the campaign in the urban centres of both regiona. The majority 
were almost certainLy housewives (75) and single women, probably 
with little education, d.-though a few of those wbo were active, 
notably the wives of certain Congress leaders, were employed, f o r  
example, as nurses or social workers. 
Very little African opposition was voiced h either 
Province t o  %he canpaign, but the principal sources of dLssent were 
Selope Them's a n t i - C o ~ s t  and anti-hdian, Rational m e d  
Bloc, which existed only in the T r a ~ l s v d ,  cerbarin African teachem* 
associatione, and the virtua;lly non-existent, but vociferous, 
Supreme Council fo r  the Federation of B a % u  Oxgmizations. Certain 
chiefs a d  headmen ma$ have expressed opposition t o  the camp&@, 
but them is no specific evidence of this. 31 sp i te  of opposition 
from these and other non-White splinter groups (76) the movement 
achieved a very wide range of support, not being depenbnt on a 
fiingle cultuml, economic, gemrational, p o l i t i c a l ,  o r  racial base. 
(I) fr. Rqer, Passive Resistance in South Africa ( ~ d e ,  1957). 
(2) See map at appendh I. 
(3) The plan f o r  the cam&@ m f  saged -the struggle confiaed to 
cities and towns Ln the first two of i t s  three stages. 
Reporb of the J o h t  Planning Council ( ~ o v e m b e ~  1952) , p m ,  8. 
(43 For the 1951 population fi-s fox the Eastern Cape and the 
Trarussvaal, see appendix 11. 
( 5 )  k 1946 them were 544,233 d i e n  Africans xegistered in 
South Afrjca and the majoxiw of these were employed in the 
urban amas of %he Tlra~lsvaal. Report of +he United Nations 
Conmission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa 
(195319 P* 43. 
( 6 )  Admittedly, the Fingo had only entered the l h t e r n  Cape after 
the 1820s. 
(7) This latter point was stress@& by Joe Matthew in an interview. 
Similar  tactics mi&t have been adopted with effect in N a t a l  
but clearly there are other factors wxch can, and did, 
restrict the value of a common c u l b  and i d e n t i i y  as a 
mobilizing force f o r  -khe defiance c m p a i p .  
(8) See "African Div3siona;L Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 t o  
1910f' in 3oUTna;L of African History, Vol. g (1) , 1968, and 
ttAfrican Participation in Ca e Politics, 1901-8qr, unpublished 
seminar paper, =CS, m / 6 7 A m  
(p) See appendix 111. 
(10) li.1 t h i s  context it would be of interest t o  discover the 
extent to which Emtern Cape African p o l i t i c d  activists in 
1952 were following a family tradition of participation in 
non-traditional p o l i t i c a l  affairs. 
(11) The few privileges accorded 50 Eastern Cape Africans were 
being eroded regardless of whether they were law abiding or 
not. Participation in * e  camp&= did accelerate the 
process, but it wa~: not a root cause. 
(12) E. F e i t ,  African Opposition in South. Africa: the failure of 
passive resistance, particulmly C b p t e r  3. 
(13) V i r t u a l l y  no reference is made in t h i s  paper to the 
consslderable ox&zational effort imrolved h pl- the 
campaign. 
(14) For the purposes of Ws paper the tern f lorganizat ion'~s  
dde ly  interprete6 to include f o d  and Mormal aspects. 
(15) TecWcdly, the African National C o w a s  Youth f R w e  
and the (~ans-mal )  fndia;n Youth Conmess. 
(16) h Indian Youth C q e s s  l3raslch was established in Port 
Elizabeth during 1952 but it does not appeaz to have 
contributed to the ~ s i a t a n c e  effort. 
(17) The Womenf S League president in the TmsvaaJ. in 1952 was Ida 
Pltwma, Out of a sample group in the Eastern Cape of 2529 
resisters, 1067 were females (1462 males). Of 488 'Prmsvd 
resisters 173 were fema3e (315 male). 
(18) Spark, 20 June 1952, p, 4. Co-ordination was facilitated by 
the absence af a generation @p between many of the Youth and 
Congress activists  and , particularly in the case of A.N.C. 
leaders, their recent or continuing membership of the Youth 
League. 
(19) The unions @i.ned more f r o m  the Congdsses during 1952 through 
increased membership than the latter benefited from trade 
union assistance in mobilizing support for the campegn. 
(20) People! s World, 4 September 1952, p.  2. 
(21) Kupex, op. c i t . ,  p .  149. 
(22) Plans for both the National Action Council and National 
Volunteers Co-ordinating Council were presented at a meet* 
of the working committee of the A.N.C. National Ekecutive on 
2 May 1952. The comit teers  recommendations were accepted at 
a joint meet* of the AmNmC. and S.A.I.C. Executives on 31 
m. 
(23) Membership included J. Moxoka (nomind) , W. S i s d u ,  B, Mandela, 
Y, C a c h a l i a .  I. A. Caichalia and D. TZoome m y  have d a o  been 
appointed to the N.A.C. It is possible that leading 
activists were co-opted, M. B. Y-, for example, said in. 
an ktemiew tha t  he had attended N.A.C. meetings during the 
campaip. 
(24) This body, unlike its Indian counterpart, met fairly 
frequently during the campaim, discusshg resistance affairs 
and issuhg occaeiond statements about defiance matters. 
See, for e m q l e ,  Advance, 15 November 1952, pp. 1 and 5. 
(25) See below. 
(26) k t h e  Transvad two distinct thou& not necessarily exclwive 
lines of contact could be maintained through the African. and 
Indian Congress structures. The dual or multiple mles of 
some Conpess officials was a f e a h  of kportmce in the 
canpaipfs c~nmmication network. 
(27) J. fitthews ~itressed the sijqificance of visits by Wdela and 
Sisulu to the Fastern Cape for the maintenance of close 
relations between that region and Johannesburg. 
(28) Membership is M yet undetemined but it is likely to have 
included the respective Congress provincial presidents and 
secretaries, You-th League representatives a d  the provincial 
voluntee~in-chief and his deputy. 
(29) The B e t h d  branch of the A.N.C., under Gert Sibande, may have 
enjoyed greater agtononlg than most others in t h e  Transvaal. 
(50) Technically, there were ei&t A.N.C. regions in the Cape, 
but the use of  the terns ftEastermff and 'Westernff Cape in 
~ K B  paper a r e  not intended to coincide with those. 
(31) Could this pattern have influenced M d e l a  in f o d a t i n g  
the 'Wf plan? 
(32) Acting President of the Cape A.N.C., treasurer f a r  the 
pmvincial or$pnization and for the New Brighton Congress 
branch. 
(33)  Whether they were initially successful ox not appaxently 
sometimes depended on the attitude of traditional loca l  
leaders. 3. Matthews, op. c i t .  
(34) Ems Nokwe, youth leader in Orlando, f o r  example, was h 
direct contact with Nelson h n d e l a  about volunteer 
matters. B this  instance, personal relations and MaYldela's 
former leadership of the A.N,C.  Youth League were cleazly 
relevant factors in the liaison. 
(35) h Port Elizabeth Africans were apparently deterred by the 
"orientaJW appearance o f  the stamps offered as a receipt.  
36) There was, however, considerable co-operation between the 
Congresses in the T~cansvad in fhmcTaL matters during the 
campaign, 
(37) Provincial secretary of the Cape A.N.C. and s e c r e t a q  o f  
the Korsten branch. 
(38) It i s  not known whether these sums w e r e  held in a l o c a l  o r  
a regional fund. 
(39) Senlor vice-president of  the Cape Indian C o w s s ,  
( 40 )  Groups outside the country o r p i z e d  o r  pmmised t o  organize 
funds f o r  the cmpaig;n, but it is not clear these were ever 
available to the Congresses. 
(41) !l?he bulletin Flash (successor t o  ~ewsletter?) appeared 
regulaxly. Youth members a l s o  produced their  own 
publications - Africa Lodestax and Spark. The l a t t e r  was 
an unoff ic iLl  newspaper, edited by R, Desai and taken evex 
by the National Action Council at the very end of the 
campaign. 
(42) See the brief reference to the issue of literacy, ppc 6&5 
a,m. 
(43) The W i a n  was b-ed in Nay 1952 and was succeeded d m h g  
during the year by the Clarion, People's: World, and Advance. 
These papers had a circulation of 30,000 to 75,000, 
prjmarily h Johamnesbtng and Cape Town. Appmxkm-beLy 80% 
o f  the readership was African, 
(44) This factor of spontaneity was central to the spread of 
resistance in the mtem Cape. 
The term is inteqmted widely t o  include those of whatever 
off ic ia l  rank who were prominent orgmizers In the campaim 
in either regjan, 
T h i ~  i s  shown cleasly h the Bepod of the Joint  Pl- 
Council o f  the A.M.C. and S.A.I.C., paragmph 7. Support for 
democratic principles provided a basis f o r  l i a i ~ o n  with other 
liberatory movements. 
A. Walshe, '?The Afx2ca;n MaSional Congress of South Africa: 
Aspects of Ideology and Orgadsation 1912-1951't, unpublished 
D,Phi1. mesis, Oxford, 1967, p.  631. 
See alao the influence of Chri~tian teachings in this respect, 
Pm 33. 
Them were added ~ ~ u n d s  for caution fo2lowing the passage of  
the Suppression of Communism Act. 
J. NgweveLa, the Western Cape A.JY,C, leader, accepted both 
Christian and Communist beliefs; there may have been other 
examples of this. 
There were, f o r  instance, two priests on the Cape A.N.C. 
Executive: Rev. J. CalaSa and Rev. W. Tshme. Others w e r e  
active at the branch level: Rev. L. S. So@, the president 
of the A.B.C. in Queenstom. 
"If we were Israelites we would have trekked out of Egypt ..." 
M, Seperepere, 22 June 1952, Reana v, Sisulu and 19 others, 
Case ~134/52, p.  131. 
Daily Representative (~ueenstown) 29 July 1952, p.  2. 
Although it is not cleaz whether his works o r  those of any 
other exponent of non-violence were read widely a m o r g ~ t  he 
leadership. 
Speech t o  the Supreme Court .  Advance, 9 April 1953. Some 
W a n  leaders may d s o  have been influenced towards non- 
violent practices by Hindu and other non-Christim creeds. 
Por a statement o f  Rehruls atti-tude, see JawahzlaJ Nehru: 
Autobio~~apby~ p. 84, taken in the context of the rest of the 
work. A marallel between the stance of the S.A.I.C. aYld the 
1 ,N.C .  i s o f f e r e d  by I, A. CachaJia, Treason T r i d  Recould, 
P, 15057- 
B a n k  World, I1 October 1952,  p. 3, and 18 October 1952, p.  4, 
Dr. S. Molema, A Historical Parallel and W e .  
M d e l a "  testimony, Treason Trial, on, cit., p.  15847. 
Walsbe, op, cit., pp. 574-6. See also letter of W. Sisulu t o  
Dr. B. Raymond of Florida, Tria l .  of Sisulv and 19 others, a 
c i t  p, 170. 
.' 
(60) The Bokwes, C a l a t a s  and Matthews were leading Eastern Cape 
f m i l i e e  md their  c o d t m e n t  t o  the campaign may have 
influenced ather people to participate. 
(62) ljllter d i a  -he  Oxf'grd dictionam applies the term t o  those 
"addicted to comfort ancl respectability, humdrum". 
( 6 3 )  See appendices I1 - =a 111. 
(64) Kuper, op. cit., p. 24. 
(65)  Euper, ibid., p. 143, denies W s .  The controvemy w a ~  
suggested in Advance, 13 November 1952, p. 5, and 'py 
J. Mhtthews. The latter believed the example of the 
defiance campaign in Port Elinabeth reduced Coloured 
' 
support there f o r  the non-European Unity Movement. 
(66) The term Asian not Indian i s  used because there is a record of 
one Chinese part icipathg.  
(67) B addition approximately 1350 Africans defled 5n the Transvaal. 
(68) There is insufficient available information t o  quantify these 
P U P S  
(69) However, I. D i d  believed that this ~ u p  often donated 
lesser amou11ts than the smdler  traders. 
(70) These hcluded the Bishop of Johamesbmg, the Chief Rabbi, 
Fr. Huddleston, a46 the Native Representatives, Advance, 
2 October 1952, p. L. 
(71) It was f r o m  people who attended this meeting and p h l y  aa a 
result of it that both the Transvaal and later South African 
C o p s s  of Democrats and the I d b e d  Party emerged, Advance, 
27 November 1952, pp. 1 and 7. The Springbok Legion a l s o  
welcomed the Defiance Camp&@, Guardian, l Mhy 1952, p ,  1. 
(72) The greatest number were m a t e d  for deq ing  cuxfew 
regulations rather than for offencea against dipping and 
culling requirements. 
(73) To t h i s  number must be added 4250 vcrlmteers who resisted in 
the main centres of t h e  Emtern Cape. 
(74) The differences were accentuated by the p h i c i p a t i o n  of the 
tfRedt' people 5n the Eastern Cape. Mayer suggests that the 
S o h t  involvement of both lfRedn and "Schoolft people in a single 
association, as occurred with the A.B.C. in 1952, was hi- 
wlu8ual. Tommen or Tribeamen, p.  82, The relative size of 
their contribution is &own, m is the precise =%me of 
CO-opemtion between the two f r ~ u p s " .  
(75) They m i & t  be self-employed, f o r  instance, as laundry women or 
possibly in domestic service. 
(76) And, of course, very con~iderable white hostility m i f e s t , f o r  
example, in interference by 1oca.l and central authorities. 
Wormat ion  about the c a q a i g n  in the Eastern  Cape and 
Transvaal has been obtained from intemiews with Y. Dadoo, 
R .  Rutchinson, P. Joseph, J. Matthews, J. PhiLZips, S. Shall  
and M, Yengwa. 
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Niwbers of Resisters in Relation t o  the Total Population 
Faatem Cape Total Resisters Total African Population 
(African) - Tom District (incl. 
 own) 
Port Elizabeth 2007 
East London 1322 
Pedrlie 644 
Uitenhage* 600 
Grahmatown (fibasly Dist . ) 361 
Queens town 133 
Ft. Beaufort 132 
Kirkwood (IJitenhge ~ist,*) I L O  
Kingxilliamstawn 98 
P o r t  Alfred. (Ba-thucst ~ i s t . )  84 
Adelaide 44 
Cradock 53 






Pre tor ia  92 
springs 74 




Bet  ha l  31 
Evaton (~ereenighg Dis t  . ) 20 
wi t b d  l1 
Total Asian 
PopuLa t ion 
District 
MOTE: (1) The Secretarial Report t o  the 21st Conference of the S.A.I.C., 
-
July 1954, mggeshted there were 5719 resisters in the Eastern 
Cape and 1911 in the 1ransnal. Tke latter figure is 
~lurprisingly hi&. 
(2) As~umSlg, tentatively, that the majority of reslaters in the 
Transvaa;l. and in the  mafa defiance centres in the Eastern Cape 
(except peadie) lived in the towns and suburbs rather than in 
the districts a m u n ~  them, it would seem t ha t  between 
-0% and .4% of the African population in T m v a a l  resistance 
centres defied, compared to approx. in centres under 
reference in the Eastern Cape. 
( 3 )  In 1946 the appmdimate African popula-bion of the Ci~kei 
and Transkei reserves was 1,573,221. About 708,300 
Africans were l iving in the Transvaal reserves and trust 
lands at this time. Population densities were at least 
three and a half tines greater in the Eastern Cape t r i ba l  
axeas thaa in the comsponding amas of the Transvaal. 
(4) Sources fo r  Appendix 11: Volume 1, Union Population 
Censw, May 1951. U.G. 42/1955. Official Yearbook of 
the Union of South Africa, 3952-1953. 
Appendix III 
Resisters* in the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal d m h g  





























%e f i p e s  refer  to the number of recorded instances of defiance by 
individuals. A few people will have resisted more thaJl once. All 
totals me provisional. 
